Today is One year ago was July 7, 2007, and Time magazine has declared it "the most popular wedding day ever." After all, the date 7-7-07 "carries some serious cosmic cachet," according to the Pittsburgh Times-Review.

Wait, wasn't I just writing about superstition just the other day?

I have been thinking about magical thinking all weekend, and my thoroughly non-scientific conclusion is that it seems to be the "default" way of thinking for human beings.

The behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner believed that superstitions arise from coincidence combined with reinforcement. When a person experiences a fortuitous (or unfortuitous) event associated with something unrelated, posits Skinner, she may come to associate the unrelated thing with the stroke of fate. Then, whenever she experiences that unrelated thing, she will look specifically for the event she believes is connected to it. If the event doesn't happen, her thinking is not affected much, but if it does, the superstition is reinforced.

But that does not explain why superstitions become embedded in cultures. Everyone in the English-speaking world knows that the number 7 is good luck (hence the popularity of the 7-7-07 wedding) and 13 is bad luck. (Good thing 13-13-13 will never appear on the calendar.) In Chinese-related cultures, 4 is unlucky. Specific colors, animals, objects, and behaviors (like knocking on wood) are frequently co-opted into superstitions.

I think the popularity of superstitions stems from the natural human tendency toward magical thinking. It's probably an adaptive way to think, since in the nitty-gritty of daily life, magical thinking will usually do a person more good than harm. It's like the way the smarter animals think. In humans, the ability to reason seems to be appended to it.

Do you have any superstitions? What are some weird superstitions you have heard of?

Science writer Brian Clegg recently wrote in his blog^* that religious thinking is often "magical" thinking. He gave several examples from the Judeo-Christian tradition, including this one from the Church of England:

I would suggest that those in the Church of England who don’t want women bishops are motivated by magic. Their argument is that it has always been that way, that Jesus only chose male apostles, and that bishops sort of stand in for Jesus, so have to be male, as he was.

Clegg is a science writer, and quite a good one, but his expertise does not extend to Christian theology. His example above confuses magical thinking with sacramental thinking.

Magical thinking is "nonscientific causal reasoning" that follows certain rules, a bit analogous to scientific laws. Like scientific laws, magical thinking does not identify these rules as arising from any particular source; they just are. Superstitions arise from magical thinking.

Christianity — particularly Catholic Christianity and those Protestant traditions most akin to Catholicism — is deeply imbued with sacramental thinking. In a sacrament, there is an outward, visible symbol of a supernatural reality. In the case of ordination, the supernatural reality is that deacons, priests, and bishops are marked with a supernatural character that gives them the ability to "stand in" for Christ. The outward symbol includes the necessity that the ordained be similar to Christ in the most fundamental way: they must be male. (I think it's interesting that the Church of England is hung-up on female bishops, since it already allows female deacons and priests — doesn't it make sense that God would require male gender for either all ordinations or for none?)

Unlike magical thinking, the associations found in sacramental theology are attributed to a specific and personal source — God. Male gender is not necessary because of our limited perceptions and understanding, nor because of some great cosmic "should"; it is necessary because God made it so.

* Do not, by any means, miss the first comment to Clegg's post! It will make your day.

Trivia #2 was not wildly popular, but neither was it totally ignored. Thanks for playing, Anna! You were correct on all four of the questions you attempted.

1. The mental disorder involving multiple personalities is called, descriptively, multiple personality disorder, or in the Psych Bible (the DSM-IV-TR), dissociative identity disorder. I was fishing for the wrong answer of schizophrenia, which contrary to the popular imagination, does not involve switching among multiple personalities at all. The confusion probably comes from the fact that some schizophrenics hallucinate that they hear voices.
2. Yeah, I meant a car that uses hydrogen as fuel. Thanks for correcting my sloppy writing. Steam would come out of the tail pipe of such a car.
3. Concupiscence is what I was looking for.
4. Jimmy Akin, Catholic apologist.
5. Richard Dawkins, atheist apologist. His writing on evolution is much more coherent, though.

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After Joe Horn killed two burglars, a grand jury no-billed him. Apparently this shooting was legal. But when something is legal, it does not necessarily follow that it is ethical or moral. How does the Horn shooting stack up against Catholic moral philosophy?

The Catechism of the Catholic Church conveniently includes an entire article on the fifth commandment ("You shall not kill") which explains exactly when one may morally kill another human being. Paragraph 2264 declares,

[I]t is legitimate to insist on respect for one's own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow.

In principle, then, Catholic teaching allows the killing of another human being for the purpose of defending one's own life. We are stewards of the life God gave us, and we have a duty to keep it safe.

The Catechism has more to say. Paragraph 2263 explains:

The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an exception to the prohibition against the murder of the innocent that constitutes intentional killing. "The act of self-defense can have a double effect: the preservation of one's own life; and the killing of the aggressor. The one is intended, the other is not."

Double effect is a philosophical principle of Thomas Aquinas, the source of the quotation in the paragraph above. The rule of double effect can be contrasted against consequentialism, commonly stated as "the ends justify the means." The essential difference between the two is that according to consequentialism, intention does not matter, while according to the rule of double effect, intention is key.

When consequentialism is applied to this situation, Horn's actions appear to be proper. If the ends justify the means, then the fact that Horn achieved a legitimately good end — the safeguarding of his own life — justifies the intentional killing that secured it.

Catholic moral teaching, however, rejects consequentialism in favor of the rule of double effect. And this rule, when applied to self-defense, demands that no more than the minimum amount of force necessary may be used to stop the threat. The Catechism quotes Aquinas, "If a man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repels force with moderation, his defense will be lawful."

The problem in the Horn case is that Horn used more than necessary violence. In fact, in his situation, violence was not necessary at all. The surest way Horn could have defended himself against the burglars would have been to simply stay inside. Horns' actions are indefensible under the rule of double effect.

Earlier in this space, I argued that Horn's primary motivation was not self-defense at all. Though the details considered by the grand jury are sealed, it apparently concluded that self-defense was the justifying principle for Horn. But even if it qualifies as self-defense, it does not qualify as a morally acceptable action. Horn may not be a criminal, but he is culpable.

On November 14, 2007, Joseph Horn called 911 and told the dispatcher he intended to go outside his home and kill two people. Before police could arrive, and despite the dispatcher imploring him to stay inside, he carried out his plan. He killed Hernando Riascos Torres and Diego Ortiz with shotgun blasts to the back.

Horn and his lawyer, Charles Lambright, have tried to mitigate Horn's actions with several other relevant facts. Torres and Ortiz were burglarizing Horn's neighbor's house when the call to authorities was placed. And after Horn went outside, they allegedly entered Horn's front yard. On the basis of these facts, two grand juries declined to indict him.

Not self-defense

The fact that Torres and Ortiz were on Horn's property when they were shot cannot alone justify a self-defense shooting. They would have to be there as part of a situation in which a reasonable person would feel his life was in immediate jeopardy. The fact that they were shot in the back seems to indicate that Horn's life was not in immediate jeopardy, at least to me (and I would like to think I am a reasonable person).

Even more damning is the indisputable fact that Horn went looking for trouble. He stated clearly that his intention was to kill the burglars. He also stated — many, many times — that the reason he was intervening was because he was "not gonna let 'em get away with it."

At one point before he went outside, Horn told the dispatcher he wanted to defend his own life. The problem with relying on this statement as evidence of a self-defense motive is that Horn put his life into far more danger by going outside.

According to the Houston Chronicle, Lambright had the audacity to say, "Just because he went outside doesn't mean he went outside with the idea of shooting them." This despite Horn's announcement to the 911 dispatcher, "I'm gonna kill 'em," and despite his hollering, "You're dead!" immediately before he fired the shotgun.

Defense of property

According to his own statements during the phone call, Horn's motivation was not defense of human life, but of property. (Someone else's property, no less.) The 911 dispatcher summed the ethics of this case up neatly while trying to dissuade Horn from his plan: "Property's not worth killing someone over."

I am flabbergasted that not just one, but two grand juries were able to overlook Horn's blatant crime. If Texas law allows these actions, then Texas lawmakers have a grave duty to correct those laws.

Further information

• ABC News story
• Houston Chronicle article from two days after the shooting, with audio of the 911 calls